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FOREWORD
The concept of soft power, that is the influence
attained through the co-option of foreigners by the
attractiveness of our values, ideas, and practices, understandably has great appeal. Soft power is much
cheaper than the hard power of military force, and it
is more compatible with the culture of a principally
liberal American society. All too often, military force
seems to fail as an instrument of policy and, as a consequence, it invites the view that it is becoming obsolescent and even anachronistic.
Dr. Colin Gray subjects hard and soft power to
close critical scrutiny and finds that the latter is significantly misunderstood and, as a consequence, misassessed as a substitute for the threat or use of military force. Each kind of power has its limitations, but
the obvious and familiar challenges characteristic of
military force do not mean that therefore soft power
should be our policy instrument of choice. The author
warns against expecting too much of soft power.
		
		
		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Power is one of the more contestable concepts in
political theory, but it is conventional and convenient
to define it as “the ability to effect the outcomes you
want and, if necessary, to change the behavior of others to make this happen.” (Joseph S. Nye, Jr.) In recent
decades, scholars and commentators have chosen to
distinguish between two kinds of power, “hard” and
“soft.” The former, hard power, is achieved through
military threat or use, and by means of economic menace or reward. The latter, soft power, is the ability to
have influence by co-opting others to share some of
one’s values and, as a consequence, to share some key
elements on one’s agenda for international order and
security. Whereas hard power obliges its addressees
to consider their interests in terms mainly of calculable costs and benefits, principally the former, soft
power works through the persuasive potency of ideas
that foreigners find attractive. The nominal promise
in this logic is obvious. Plainly, it is highly desirable if
much of the world external to America wants, or can
be brought to want, a great deal of what America happens to favor also. Coalitions of the genuinely willing
have to be vastly superior to the alternatives.
Unfortunately, although the concept of American soft power is true gold in theory, in practice it
is not so valuable. Ironically, the empirical truth behind the attractive concept is just sufficient to mislead policymakers and grand strategists. Not only
do Americans want to believe that the soft power of
their civilization and culture is truly potent, we are
all but programmed by our enculturation to assume
that the American story and its values do and should
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have what amounts to missionary merit that ought
to be universal. American culture is so powerful a
programmer that it can be difficult for Americans to
empathize with, or even understand, the somewhat
different values and their implications held deeply
abroad. The idea is popular, even possibly authoritative, among Americans that ours is not just an “ordinary country,” but instead is a country both exceptionally blessed (by divine intent) and, as a consequence,
exceptionally obliged to lead Mankind. When national
exceptionalism is not merely a proposition, but is more
akin to an iconic item of faith, it is difficult for usually
balanced American minds to consider the potential of
their soft power without rose-tinted spectacles. And
the problem is that they are somewhat correct. American values, broadly speaking “the American way,”
to hazard a large project in reductionism, are indeed
attractive beyond America’s frontiers and have some
utility for U.S. policy. But there are serious limitations
to the worth of the concept of soft power, especially as
it might be thought of as an instrument of policy. To
date, the idea of soft power has not been subjected to a
sufficiently critical forensic examination. In particular,
the relation of the soft power of attraction and persuasion to the hard power of coercion urgently requires
more rigorous examination than it has received thus
far.
When considered closely, the subject of soft power
and its implications for the hard power of military
force reveals a number of plausible working propositions that have noteworthy meaning for U.S. policy
and strategy.
1. Hard military threat and use are more difficult
to employ today than was the case in the past, in part
because of the relatively recent growth in popular
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respect for universal humanitarian values. However,
this greater difficulty does not mean that military
force has lost its distinctive ability to secure some political decisions. The quality of justification required
for the use of force has risen, which means that the
policy domain for military relevance has diminished,
but has by no means disappeared.
2. The political and other contexts for the use of
force today do not offer authoritative guidance for
the future. History is not reliably linear. To know the
2000s is not necessarily to know the 2010s.
3. The utility of military force is not a fixed metric
value, either universally or for the United States. The
utility of force varies with culture and circumstance,
inter alia. It is not some free-floating objective calculable truth.
4. For both good and for ill, ethical codes are
adapted and applied under the pressure of more or
less stressful circumstances, and tend to be significantly situational in practice. This is simply the way
things are and have always been. What a state licenses
or tolerates by way of military behavior effected in its
name depends to a degree on how desperate and determined are its policymakers and strategists.
5. War involves warfare, which means military
force, which means violence that causes damage, injury, and death. Some of the debate on military force
and its control fails to come to grips with the bloody
reality, chaos, and friction that is in the very nature of
warfare. Worthy and important efforts to limit conduct in warfare cannot avoid accepting the inherent
nastiness of the subject. War may be necessary and it
should be restrained in its conduct, but withal it is by
definition illiberally violent behavior.
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6. By and large, soft power should not be thought
of as an instrument of policy. America is what it is,
and the ability of Washington to project its favored
“narrative(s)” is heavily constrained. Cultural diplomacy and the like are hugely mortgaged by foreigners’ own assessments of their interests. And a notable
dimension of culture is local, which means that efforts
to project American ways risk fueling “blow-back.”
7. Soft power cannot sensibly be regarded as a substantial alternative to hard military power. Familiarity with the concept alone encourages the fallacy that
hard and soft power have roughly equivalent weight
and utility. An illusion of broad policy choice is thus
fostered, when in fact effective choices are severely
constrained.
8. An important inherent weakness of soft power
as an instrument of policy is that it utterly depends
upon the uncoerced choices of foreigners. Sometimes
their preferences will be compatible with ours, but
scarcely less often they will not be. Interests and cultures do differ.
9. Soft power tends to be either so easy to exercise
that it is probably in little need of a policy push, being essentially preexistent, or too difficult to achieve
because local interests, or culture, or both, deny it political traction.
10. Hard and soft power should be complementary, though often they are not entirely so. U.S. national
style, reflecting the full array of American values as a
hegemonic power, has been known to give some cultural and hence political offense abroad, even among
objective allies and other friends. Whereas competent
strategy enables hard military power to be all, or most
of what it can be, soft power does not lend itself readily to strategic direction.
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11. Provided the different natures of hard and soft
power are understood—the critical distinguishing factor being coercion versus attraction—it is appropriate
to regard the two kinds of power as mutual enablers.
However, theirs is an unequal relationship. The greater attractiveness of soft power is more than offset in
political utility by its inherent unsuitability for policy
direction and control.
From all the factors above, it follows that military
force will long remain an essential instrument of policy. That said, popular enthusiasm in Western societies
for the placing of serious restraints on the use of force
can threaten the policy utility of the military. The ill
consequences of America’s much-manifested difficulty in thinking and behaving strategically are augmented perilously when unwarranted faith is placed upon
soft power that inherently is resistant to strategic direction. Although it is highly appropriate to be skeptical of the policy utility of soft power, such skepticism
must not be interpreted as implicit advice to threaten
or resort to military force with scant reference to moral
standards. Not only is it right in an absolute sense, it is
also expedient to seek, seize, and hold the moral high
ground. There can be significant strategic advantage
in moral advantage—to risk sounding cynical. Finally, it is essential to recognize that soft power tends to
work well when America scarcely has need of it, but
the more challenging contexts for national security require the mailed fist, even if it is cushioned, but not
concealed, by a glove of political and ethical restraint.
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HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER:
THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE
21ST CENTURY
Simply put, power is the ability to effect the outcomes
you want, and if necessary, to change the behavior of
others to make this happen.
Joseph S. Nye Jr., 20021
Hard times make for soft principles.
Gavin Lyall, 19932

INTRODUCTION: RUST ON THE MAILED FIST?
Fighting is the core competency of the soldier; he is
a specialist in violence. While armed forces can serve
many purposes, what defines them uniquely is their
ability to damage things and injure or kill people as
a legitimate instrument of the polity. When functioning under the authority of law to advance or protect
the political interests of a security community, the
soldier can be said to threaten or execute force rather
than violence.3 This distinction in language, and even
in concept, is apt to be clearer in principle than it is in
practice, particularly if one is on the receiving end.
The main purpose of this analysis is to consider
the relevance of military power today as well as for
tomorrow. This is a subject that should give one pause
before claiming a confident understanding of it. Major
trends seem clear enough, but will they continue? The
frequency with which history shows a liking for irony
suggests that the future context for military power
may be unlike that of today, in good part because
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the contemporary situation contains features that
will be repudiated in the future in some mixture of
thought, word, and deed. The course of history assuredly reveals that events must advance from what
preceded them, which is why defense analysis, especially if it seeks to peer into the future, must honor
chronology. But the chronology of historical narrative
may obscure the traps of nonlinearity. What we know
for certain about the 21st century is that we know little
of detail with total assurance. Moreover, even broad
trends that appear to have unstoppable momentum
are not to be trusted to deliver on their obvious promise.
History must be our guide, if only because nothing
else is accessible. Unfortunately, the past as it is interpreted in the history written by historians provides
anything but a reliable compass. Argument either
by historical analogy, or at the least with illustration
by historical anecdote claimed to be pertinent, is the
rule, not the exception, in political discourse.4 This is
scarcely surprising, since today is by definition both
brief and unstable, while the future by definition is
blank. All that is available as an evidential base for our
political and strategic guidance is a past that cannot be
recovered faithfully, even by those who seek honestly
to do so, with the result that the past is mediated by
historians. Since many facts do not speak with total
clarity for themselves, they have to be interpreted by
historians, amateur and professional.5 A factually reliable chronicle of an obviously major episode in the recent past, World War II say, or the Cold War, is easier
to assemble than is a theory, or rather an explanation,
which makes thoroughly persuasive sense of the subject at issue.
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All too obviously, this monograph cannot and
should not seek to build from a clean slate. Of course
one seeks truth, but already there is a great deal that
claims to be that rare commodity out there, both in
the marketplace of popular ideas and also in the laws,
rules, customs, norms, and policies currently extant
and indeed variably authoritative. Readers scarcely
need reminding that my subject is not at all terra incognita. In point of fact, the very strength of the contemporary Western currency of beliefs and rules is itself
something of a challenge to this particular project.
Moreover, the political, legal, and cultural authority of
some attitudes that now are dominant can hardly be
doubted. Unfortunately, the subject in need of debate
for a more prudent understanding is neither the identity nor the desirability of current practice. Rather, it
is the overriding issue of the validity of assuming that
present contexts determining what is widely believed
to be the utility or disutility of force have authority for
the future.
For the educational purposes of this monograph,
I need to be more respectful of some politically incorrect arguments than is usual, to break some culturally attractive conceptual crockery, and generally to
be less than tolerant of some fashionable assumptions
and theories. Possibly contrary to appearances, the
purpose here is constructive and not destructive for
its own sake. But, as the old excuse for atrocity declares, “One cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs.”
The plan of attack for this inquiry is to examine
the question of the utility of force in the 21st century
through the lenses that 11 propositions provide. They
differ in focus and attitude, and fairly can be judged to
include the correct, the incorrect, the correct but mis-

3

leading, and the incorrect but enlightening. They have
been selected and exploited for their forensic value,
not their close fit with what this author believes to be
sound. Agreement, disagreement, and partial conditional agreement are registered as best fits the case.
The coda comprises a holistic argument in the form of
a set of concluding points that have more or less explicit meaning for policy, strategy, and tactics. These
conclusions express the outcome to the deliberately
granular analyses in the main body of discussion.
11 PROPOSITIONS
1. Military force has less utility as an instrument
of policy in the 21st century than it did in times past,
even recent times past.
This claim is popular today. The contemporary evidence in its support appears persuasive, and there is
no shortage of theory to explain why it should be true.
But all that glitters may not be gold, as this monograph
will suggest. Commentators and theorists always
have trouble distinguishing stand-alone events and
episodes from trends. The analogy with climatology
is almost too persuasive. In truth, it is a poor journalist
or scholar who is unable to show that current conditions—political, strategic, or meteorological—are not
indicative of a trend or two, be they welcome or otherwise. There tends to be fame and fortune in the notice
that signally good or bad news (it may not much matter which), colorfully conveyed, attracts.
Since all theorists have historical and other coordinates in time, place, and circumstance, so too must
their theories bear some greater or lesser imprint of
the contexts of their authors. When married to the ap-
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parently irresistible human weakness for favoring the
relative significance of the present, the widespread
attractions of the idea of progress tend to produce
ahistorical prognoses of the declining utility of force.
Americans (or Britons) who argue today that military
force is much less useful a tool for policy than used
to be the case, may be making one or more among
several candidate claims. Specifically, whether or not
they themselves realize it, they could be suggesting
any of the following (and this is only a modest selection among the options possible):
a. Globally, for all potential belligerents, military
force is of declining utility.
b. Military force is not as useful as was the case,
even quite recently, for some security communities,
but not for others.
c. Military force is not as useful in wars wherein
the warfare is largely of an irregular character as it is
in others wherein a customary style of combat dominates. Because today and in the “forseeable future”
an irregular character to warfare is, and is expected
to be, predominant, military force now is at a heavy
discount.6
There is much to recommend the three options
just offered, but there is a serious possibility that
the measure of truth that each contains is more than
balanced by its ability to mislead. The first option,
ironically, is unsound despite the fact that it is correct and somewhat plausible. Specifically, the now
near-instant global access to information enabled by
information technology (IT) and space systems, both
encourage and discourage the use of force, when
force is regarded as a performance for global political
(and moral) theater. The global media market that de-
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lights in recording atrocities, real or merely claimed,
does not necessarily discourage such happenings. On
the contrary, the global IT that feeds material for the
activation of consciences around the world provides
just the marketing assets that some belligerents crave
in their demand for attention. We need to beware of
theorizing about a context that while truly global, is
less than universally common in its meaning.7
The second option may well be true, but it might
have merit only as a judgment on particular discretionary choices at particular times and places. When
military force does not succeed in supporting the
goals in its political guidance, it is only reasonable to
claim that such force proved less than adequately useful. However, it may well be that the fault lay with the
political mission assigned, possibly with the strategy
(if any, worthy of the label) attempted, or with a military instrument unable to perform effectively in the
field for a number of reasons largely internal to itself.
Conflicts and wars can be complex phenomena, as can
international relations much more broadly; this means
that one should not rush to judgment on the question
of the utility or disutility of military force.
The third option suggests that military force may
be losing its relative value because it is counterproductive or otherwise ineffective in warfare of an irregular
character. This argument can be illustrated by the currently fashionable claim to the effect that we cannot
kill our way to victory in Afghanistan. This option is
problematic in at least two principal respects. First, it
could be less true than it is popular to acknowledge.
Second, even if it is as true as its host of adherents
today maintain, it is less than self-evident that the
conflicts, wars, and warfare of tomorrow will share
a character that does not privilege military power
among the tools of grand strategy.
6

Notwithstanding the skeptical notes just struck,
plainly the thesis that military power is less useful today than yesterday has much to recommend it. That
said, there is much wisdom in the words of Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, when he advised famously that “[g]eneral propositions do not
decide concrete cases.”8 Although this monograph is
seeking some general truth about the utility of military force in the 21st century, it is acutely alert to the
potential peril of confusing a few concrete cases with
irrefutable evidence of a fully matured truth. An
American failure to use military force in ways that
proved successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, should
that be one’s current verdict, may have no justification in other episodes of belligerency. Those “concrete
cases” may speak only for themselves. They may say
little about the strategic value of military force against
other belligerents both today and tomorrow, and also
as employed by the United States and Britain at other
times and in other places and circumstances. Nonetheless, it would be irresponsible in the extreme to attempt to dismiss recent nonuse-of-force prescriptions
as harbingers of conflict in a century that is barely 10
years old. We simply do not know what this century
will bring.
It is helpful to approach the question of the disutility of military force, that is, quintessential “hard power,” with reference to constraints and disincentives.
The proposition that military force has lost some, perhaps much, of its usefulness as an instrument of policy
is broadly supported by four apparently persuasive
claims: two are best categorized under the banner of
constraints, and two under that of disincentives.
The content of the constraints basket can be summarized in the twin judgments that the use of military
force now entails costs that are much too high, and
7

secures rewards that are unduly meager. The familiar cost-benefit discriminator lends itself to casual deployment that undercuts the case for military action
today. When Americans in search of revenge for honor affronted and pain suffered have largely quenched
their thirst (as over September 11, 2001 [9/11]), liberal
values tend to reappear from the bunker wherein they
hid for a while, and the public recalls what it does
not like about warfare. War means warfare, inter alia,
and warfare means death, destruction, and taxes. The
conduct of warfare inherently is illiberal behavior,
no matter how noble or even inalienable the political (and moral) cause of the moment. The nastiness of
war, any war, can be justified in our culture only in
terms of its consequential, not its expressive, rewards.
The consequences of war and warfare plausibly have
to be weighed with the cost-benefit verdict plainly
showing as positive for us and our values. When such
is not obviously the result, then the cost-benefit books
do not balance, let alone show a healthy imbalance for
the “right.”
In the first decade of this century, America waged
warfare that has been unmistakably shy of some approximation of victory. Moreover, the moral climate
for contemporary political behavior (warfare is political behavior), has been singularly unpermissive
of what allegedly appears as the gratuitous use of
military force. Military action, even precisely targeted
military action, is portrayed as atrocity by a now globalized media. Writing in the late 1990s, Michael Ignatieff explained the contemporary context for the use of
force as follows:
The world is not becoming more chaotic or violent,
although our failure to understand and act makes
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it seem so. Nor has the world become more callous.
Weak as the narrative of compassion and moral commitment may be, it is infinitely stronger than it was
only fifty years ago. We are scarcely aware of the extent to which our moral imagination has been transformed since 1945 by the growth of a language and
practice of moral universalism, expressed above all in
a shared human rights culture. Television in its turn
makes it harder to sustain indifference or ignorance.9

Today there is a political and moral battle that inherently is hard to win when one conducts warfare
against enemies who hide, yet fight “amongst the
people,” and are able to decline to do battle of a kind
where they might be defeated swiftly and decisively.10
When we now consider the matter of disincentives
to resort to military force, it follows all too naturally
from the previous discussion of constraints that two
negative considerations are apt to dominate the field
of policy debate. First, so the argument goes, today
there is less to gain by the use of military power, even
if such use is strategically successful. Second, it can
be suggested plausibly that the risks of the resort to
military force are significantly different than used to
be the case. War remains in principle the servant of
the national interest, just as it is still properly held
to be the legitimate last resort of the polity. But, increasingly so it would seem, warfare also needs to be
“lawfare.”11 Whether or not the national interest might
be advanced or protected by force, and whether or
not the polity deems itself to be in a situation of “last
resort,” war today requires persuasive legal justification.12 Efforts to provide that justification are likely to
be more or less challengeable. The legal and legalistic
argument will carry a heavy burden of moral baggage, and this weight will likely have practical impli-
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cations for the conduct and consequences of the warfare. War is always a gamble, a risky endeavor, as Carl
von Clausewitz sought to emphasize.13 For today and
prospectively tomorrow, the context includes a now
global, attentive, and skeptical news media, and the
inconvenient reality that much of contemporary conflict is irregular in character. Today in war, the consequential costs of failure, even of some success, tend to
be higher than they were in the 20th century. It should
be needless to say that the cost of failure in a major
traditional war has always been high.
Since it would seem that the costs of war have risen
while the potential rewards have fallen, it is not a hard
sell or a leap of faith to claim that the utility of military
force is on a sharp decline. Unfortunately, the foregoing would not be a safe judgment to make, as is said
sometimes about legal verdicts. Plausible, perhaps not
implausible, yes; true, probably not. Most especially
is the judgment on the disutility of military force unsafe with regard to the possible behavior of noticeably
un-American polities and societies (and tribes and
gangs). Paradoxically, the very fact of war’s obvious
unattractiveness to America, and its closer friends and
allies, must prove an incentive to America’s enemies
to fight on—and on.14 This assertion seeks to oblige
some contemporary noble hopes that masquerade as
enlightened assumptions, to confront the enduring
conflictive nature of our history. The spoils of victory
are not what they once were—for example, territory,
gold and other natural resources, and glory—but they
are still substantial. The currencies of relative gain alter, but not the competition or the reality of winners
and losers.

10

2. Times change—history is chronological, but it is
not reliably linear.
To know the first decade of the 21st century is not to
know the second or, indeed, any decade in the future.
Some of the pathologies that typically are discernible
in defense planning are confidently attributable to
unsound approaches to genuine dilemmas. In truth
there is no thoroughly sound way in which to prepare
against the security and defense problems of tomorrow. Unfortunately, we have to attempt the impossible, which is why one should be empathetic towards
those who must provide answers for questions that,
as yet, are unspecified.15 It is commonplace to refer
to defense planning without being specific as to just
what one means. For the purposes of this monograph,
such planning is understood broadly rather than narrowly. Defense planning is approached here as any
behavior that purposefully connects ends, ways, and
means, and which pertains to the actual or conditionally possible use of military force. The plans can be
regarded as strategies, and they may be more or less
formal.16 All too obviously the merit in our strategies,
including our military plans, will depend upon their
relevance to future circumstances, as well as to their
performance when executed by our assets existing on
the day of commitment.
Because of America’s generally defensive stance in
support of a values-based world order that it has had
a considerable share in designing, plans and planning
are apt to be a less useful way of coping with the future than one might suppose. In order to be as ready
as it is able to cope with a future that it cannot design,
America needs to prepare rather than plan. The planning function certainly is critically important, and it
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requires military professionals who are both educated
in strategy and trained in how to produce plans. But it
should be understood that beyond the revealed needs
of today, the defense planner is engaged in defense
preparation. And that preparation pertains to the ability to adapt well enough to the policy demands that
arise out of contexts currently impossible to predict
with high assurance.
The beginning of a prudent wisdom regarding the
utility of military force is to recognize two inconvenient historical realities. First, times change. Moreover,
times change frequently and unpredictably. Second,
while our tiny temporal island of “today” necessarily looms largest in our relative significance rating
for historical moments, such elevation of the present
is always likely to mislead. Today must matter most,
in the obvious sense that whatever the future holds
has to flow from what is current. However, because
we can only attempt to reset the future from today, it
does not follow that we can be assured of success. It
can be difficult even for historically educated people
to appreciate realities that they find unwelcome. To be
specific, people tend to resist the following plausible
propositions:
•	The notion of progress is a matter of definition;
it carries particular meanings in particular cultures.
•	Material advance and moral progress frequently are conflated and confused. Societies that become better equipped are not, ipso facto, better.
•	Similarly, to be better off, in the sense of more
wealthy, is not necessarily to be better in any
way other than the material; indeed, increase
in wealth may correlate with greater selfishness
and a greater vulnerability as one’s assets become more attractive to predators.
12

•	Change need not mean progress.
• Change need not be linear and unidirectional.
Our judgment can hardly help being influenced by
our values, and those will vary with time, place, and
circumstance (see Proposition 3). It is only human to
seek improvement, inter alia, and also it is human to
confuse aspiration with probability. Our goal here is
not the relatively easy one of identifying, understanding, and then explaining the contemporary balance of
costs and benefits attendant upon the threat or use of
military force. Even that duty is more complex than it
may appear, because of the need to recognize variety
(for example, of actor and strategic context). The challenge here is not to interpret the evidence of today for
today. Instead, in effect it is to consider what, if anything, our current context means for the future. While
today is most obviously a milestone on history’s journey and has to be the departure gate for the remainder
of the century, can it speak powerfully to the probable
character of the strategic future?
Major plausible fallacies must be identified as such
and duly need to be slain. First, there is the assumption that because today is different from the past, the
latter is of no enduring consequence. The solemn, even
banal, pronouncement that “times have changed,” can
be deployed portentously as the basis for the master
claim that reference to old ideas and happenings as
claimed analogies, is simply anachronistic.17 Second,
almost any historical self-awareness should advise
that the future is not foreseeable and is not capable
of being shaped and directed purposefully, and that
it need not be characterized by features that suggest
moral improvement. Because of the interplay of complexity, paradox, and irony, as noted earlier, it would
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be unwise to assume that the first decade of the 21st
century tells us much that is useful about the whole of
the century yet to come. Also, it would be imprudent
to assume that this century must proceed in a generally linear fashion on a course extrapolated from the
present and most recent past.
It is plausible to stake the claim for the 21st century that “this time it will be different” with respect
to the nature of strategic history. When one draws
inferences concerning the future from how bloody
and unpredictable the 20th century was, one is often
accused of anachronistic thinking. Because everything that occurs can happen only as a consequence
of what went before, it is no simple matter to evade
the snares of determinism. Given that few events are
truly random even though caused, often it is difficult
to argue persuasively on behalf of genuinely alternative futures. One suspects that the burden of ex post
facto knowledge often is fatal for suitably capacious
historical judgment. It can be said that the knowledge
of what happened is a curse that the past puts on the
historian who strives in vain to be properly elastic in
his thinking, despite his unavoidable grasp of the consequences of decisions.
At this early juncture, I am suggesting what should
be an unremarkable thesis: that we do not know what
the 21st century will bring. This argument is best appreciated when we recognize that our predecessors
did not know what their future would be, and we
have no convincing reason to suppose that our future
is any more reliably predictable than was theirs. If
my argument is held to be plausible, even if contestable, it should at the very least suggest to readers that
contemporary predictions anticipating the utility or
disutility of military force in the future are not to be
trusted.
14

3. The utility of military force varies with culture
and circumstance.
Over-simple theory has a mighty ability to mislead.
The simple idea that seems to capture and discipline a
messy and therefore potentially uncontrollable reality
all too often is simply wrong. Even more dangerous is
the idea that is sound when applied adaptively with
high contextual specificity, but almost begs to be misused. Two would-be imperial concepts lie at the core
of this inquiry: the idea that military force has a utility,
and the recent popularity of the more than marginally
problematic idea of strategic culture.18 These two ideas
are central to the contemporary debate over the challenge to the kind of world order that is most favored
and is substantially policed by the threat and use of
American-led military power.
Before critics dash to their computers to complain
that this author has long argued in praise of both military force as a potent instrument for order, and also
for the importance of culture—most especially in the
form of strategic culture—allow me to clarify. An essential concept should not be condemned or retired
just because it is frequently misused. When adopted
uncritically and without noticeably perceptive situational awareness, nearly every idea in the strategist’s
conceptual arsenal can be dangerous. Deterrence,
arms control, irregular warfare, and peace, inter alia,
are all perilous to adopt without discrimination. We
shall return to the subject of strategic culture in the
pages to follow.
The other idea that resides at the heart of this
monograph is the proposition that force has utility,
or should it be “a” utility? By addressing the subject
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of the utility of military force in the 21st century, the
discussion may appear to concede preemptively that
which really needs to be regarded as problematic. As
phrased, the proposition certainly implies, I believe
unsoundly, that military force has “[a?] utility as an
instrument of policy.” Sometimes, the quality of an
answer is critically dependent on the sense in the
question. But in this particular case, an implicit question poorly articulated does serve agreeably to elicit
a meaningful answer. In fact, the problematic aspects
of the term “utility of force,” those that might attract
scholarly criticism (utility to whom, where, when,
and of what kinds?), act as a magnet for analysis that
should be stimulating to clarity of thought about policy, strategy, and military tactics.
Despite the popularity and essential integrity of
the idea that military force has utility for policy, qualities reinforced by General Sir Rupert Smith’s important work on the subject, The Utility of Force (2005), the
concept should always be accompanied by a notice
advising “handle with care.”19 Why? The reasons for
particularly careful handling include the following:
•	Military force is not a simple quality/quantity that can be thoughts of and treated as an
elementary particle, irreducible in substance; it
is complex and comes in packages of differing
sizes and contents.
•	Warfare can take many forms—most obviously irregular, hybrid, regular, and something
different with weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).
•	The utility of military force cannot depend only
upon the quality and quantity of force threatened or applied, but most crucially upon the
political determinant of required strategic effectiveness.
16

•	One size will not fit all. Notwithstanding the
many features of globalization that have the potential to smooth out some differences among
still distinctive polities and their societies, the
strategic contexts and cultures of actual and
potential belligerents assuredly will be more or
less asymmetrical.
•	Even if, miraculously and improbably, one
size in utility/disutility of military force were
to fit nearly all polities, how much would that
strange cultural fact matter, if and when their
strategic circumstances were to vary hugely?
•	Finally, on this very short list of skeptical
thoughts, even if one were to sign on to the heroically commanding belief that the degree of
the utility of military force can, as it were, be
quantified over time, would one then be willing to claim that there is an unalterable trend
showing the less military force applied, the
better?
Still, we must be careful. Plainly, the subject of the
utility of military force is of the highest importance. In
addition, there is no doubt that what can be called the
terms for its engagement as an active instrument of
policy have changed; indeed, they have been changing for a long time. Recent realities of global communication and post-Cold War circumstances have
encouraged the notion that “the sky is falling,” all is
changing. This is not entirely a foolish misperception.
Times are changing. But the quintessential strategist’s
question, “So what?” can be augmented by another
one, “When did they not?” It is necessary to come to
grips with the cultural and situational dimensions that
are vital to the sense in our examination, yet which
frequently are not considered with sufficient rigor.
17

4. “Hard times make for soft principles.”
We return now to the subject of strategic context
and culture. It may be argued that strategic context
is what you can make of it, while what you can make
of it will be influenced strongly by what you bring to
the task culturally. For an alternative and noticeably
contrasting argument, you may argue that strategic
culture is what you choose and are able to do in strategic circumstances that are both somewhat given, as
well as negotiated competitively by threat and by the
use of force, or by some positive inducement. The first
definition suggests a rather fixed relationship between
an objective strategic context and a no less objective
strategic culture. The fourth proposition set forth
above claims that “soft principles,” or permissive culture, as a guide for action correlates with and results
from stressful circumstances. The claim obviously
empowers situation over culture in deciding between
hard and soft principles.20
This theorist is unwilling to jump ship from the
strategic cultural vessel on which he has been sailing
for many years, but he is willing to move on from a
view of the subject that may have been unduly static
and insufficiently open to recognition of the potency
of situation, contingency, and the universal nature of
the individual human factor. In historical practice,
contexts for the use of force tend by no means to be
entirely “givens” for policymakers and soldiers. Proposition 4 makes the claim that people are likely to do
what they believe they must do in order to succeed,
perhaps just to survive, in the circumstances in which
they find themselves. If embraced with undue enthusiasm, this assertion-prediction amounts to the claim
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that all is permissible under the lash of perceived
necessity. From a historical perspective, it should be
immediately apparent that this claim is seriously misleading. To be specific: most security communities are
able to choose whether or not to use force, even in selfdefense; similarly, when at war, most communities
are able to exercise some discretion as to how much
effort, and of what kinds, they will expend in the
struggle. Of course, the enemy has a vote, “friction”
happens,21 contingency is active, and the course of the
warfare will be a bloodily contested path negotiated
by the competition in violence. However, polities are
not puppets. And it makes no sense to discuss the utility of force as a great abstraction utterly innocent of
reference to strategy.
Moral restraint on the style and quantity of warmaking is a dimension—indeed, it can be an enabler—
of strategy, though it is helpful to think of the relationship as being one of interdependence. Moral restraint
works to limit ferocity, and it thereby enables force to
be employed to advantage for political purposes.22 Applied ethics, which is to say morality, is a necessary
gatekeeper against the danger of “absolute war.”23 In
the absence of such restraint, the nature of war is such
that reciprocal ferocity is apt to produce an outcome
of mutual ruination. The utility of force is a dependent
variable governed primarily by political calculation.
Whether or not the threat and use of force has utility depends not only on the character of the military
force available, but rather more on the character of the
political objectives to be pursued. However, even if
the conflict in question is believed to be about political
survival, and not merely advantage and disadvantage,
it is by no means always the case that it is deemed
sensible to exert all the force available. Restraint may
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be minimal, but still it is rare indeed for it to be absent
altogether. History does not record many true wars of
annihilation, wherein even genocide of the literal kind
is found acceptable and possibly desirable. Such war
is not entirely unknown, but it and its closer relatives
in mass atrocity are outlier happenings, not routine
episodes. The principal reason why this is so is not exactly mysterious—it is self-interest.24 Warfare waged
ferociously is apt to stimulate the enemy to behave
likewise.
There is little doubt that there is some sense in the
fourth preposition. Under the duress of war, polities do authorize their sword arms to behave in ways
that are deemed legitimate and legal. Necessity is the
excuse and the explanation; at least it is at present.
Moreover, the UN Charter that now is the principal
source of legal authority for the conduct of war, both
recognizes self-defense as the inherent right of states
and neglects to oblige them to receive the first blow. In
international law, on many aspects the right to fight is
notably discretionary.25
Notwithstanding the existence of a formidable
body of laws, rules, norms, and customs that have
been conflated by scholars into the compound concept
of the “war convention,” the fact remains that political behavior regarding the use of force is governed far
more by considerations of prudent self-interest than it
is by legal or ethical codes.26 Fortunately, such codes
for restraint that now are extant generally function to
serve the interests of belligerents. But this fact should
not be permitted to obscure another fact, which is that
when polities experience crisis and wage war, they
contend for the right to determine the rules of engagement (ROE) that best suit them. This is a variant on
Thomas Schelling’s famous description of warfare as
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a “diplomacy of violence,” wherein the belligerents
strive coercively to dominate the rules of the road for
a particular conflict.27
To return to the main theme, it would be erroneous
to postulate that either the times or one’s principles
must have some self-evident immanent quality (for example, the effect of hard times ) that allow little discretion in action. Both times and principles will be givens
for policymakers and soldiers, but scarcely ever is that
the end of the story. Policy choice is straightforward,
even if the options are all more or less unappealing,
while principles typically require and allow for some
interpretation. The cultural complexion of a society is
not fixed, nor does it forbid exceptional behavior that
may become blessed as authoritative precedent, even
if it was first chosen in desperation out of a perceived
brutal necessity. If a nation is behaving strategically,
which in theory is the norm in human affairs, the utility of force is determined by what amounts to a negotiation between political ends and military means,
mediated by the ways of strategy. Political ends reign
and sometimes rule over ways and their means, but
such authority is limited. Because military force is apt
to be exceptionally costly when compared with the
employment of the other grand-strategic instruments
of policy, typically today its use requires an unusually
strong justification.
However, to record this reality is not to argue that
such force has lost utility, and still less is it to suggest that military force is yesterday’s policy weapon.
Nonetheless, it is valid to argue that the use of force is
more costly today than was the case in the past. Ironically, the declining domain of the legitimacy of military force, and the diminishing discretion accorded
over style of military use, render force particularly
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attractive to some belligerents. As political theater,
expressive violence as a form of military force has no
obviously superior rivals. Americans should not be
surprised by the large measure of plausibility in this
proposition. History, including contemporary history, shows that ethics are notably situational.28 This
is an unhappy reflection on our species, but it is one
that is difficult to oppose convincingly. If we are sufficiently desperate, or angry and vengeful, we are probably capable of just about any character of nastiness.
The proposition that military force has lost much of
its utility is, alas, persuasive only with reference to a
historical context wherein the perceived necessity for
its large-scale employment is low and believed to be
trending ever lower. As of this moment, there are no
thoroughly compelling reasons to believe that “hard
times” are now definitively ended, or that much harder times may well lie in the not far distant future. Once
this claim is granted a serious audience, the fragility
and imprudence of the argument for the decreasing
utility of military force is revealed. The emperor is
conceptually naked.
5. Warfare may be strategic surgery conducted under law for political ends, but also it is brute force
or violence.
War is a legal condition that is defined most particularly by the fact that its motivation must be political. But it has the phenomenon of organized violence
as a defining characteristic. Strictly speaking, force
is made manifest in immediate consequence as violence. Force falls a little way short of being a euphemism for violence; admittedly, there is some daylight
in meaning between the two terms. However, official
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references to violence done by our soldiers are eschewed by and large for reasons far removed from a
commitment to clarity in the use of language. Liberal
democracies today are not comfortable employing the
inherently illiberal means that reside ready for use in
the basket of options latent in military capabilities.
There is tension between the high purposes frequently
expressed in terms of values, and the low means by
which they sometimes have to be advanced. This tension is revealed in the complexity of key relationships
that lurk within the compound concept of the contemporary world order. This grand concept is a conflation
of the following dimensions:
• Political order
• Legal order
• Social-cultural and moral order
• Military strategic order.
The discussion here pertains to the order of the
social scientist, not the physical scientist. Everything
impacts on everything else. As states rise and fall, they
tend to provoke considerable disorder. In fact, it is
necessary to recognize that world order, like culture,
is ever in motion; it is always becoming something
somewhat different. World order should be understood in the terms comparable to those with which
Sheila Jager explains culture, namely, as “an on-going
process of negotiation between past and present.”29
This “negotiation” can involve the “diplomacy of
violence,” to borrow again from Schelling. But liberal
democracies today—and even yesterday—have difficulty understanding that the dynamism and complex
processes of world order require support by the threat
and occasional use of military force.
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The black heart of the dilemma driving this discussion is the sheer nastiness of warfare (unpleasantness
is far too mild a word). The dilemma that good people
sometimes need to be ready and able to resort to bad
means is typically resolved in one or both of two ways.
One is that the military tools of violence are washed
clean enough by the legitimate and virtuous purposes
for which they are applied. The other is that the evil of
the death and destruction wrought by military force
is mitigated by a variety of means—technical, tactical,
operational, strategic, legal, ethical, and political.
There are problems great and small with both of
the approaches just cited for the laundering of war
and warfare. A major difficulty with the long-standing
and worthy endeavor to provide a hedge of technical
restraints on war through variants upon the theme of
“just war,” is that the endeavor legitimizes, as well
as constrains, the right to fight. Moreover, efforts to
make the challenge of war an ethical matter and a legal one are ultimately doomed to failure. The reason
should not be too difficult to grasp. Wars are not about
ethics or law. This is not to deny that ethical traditions
and a moral dimension, as well as legal argument, are
relevant to public discourse and hence can have political and strategic implications. The point is that war is
not fundamentally an ethical or a legal phenomenon
despite the powerful influence that moral and legal arguments can have, especially in post facto debate. Individuals, organized groups, societies, politics, nations,
and states always operate with mixed motivations.
There are few, if any, causes for which there is and can
be no justification, at least in some minds. True, there
is some sense in the concepts of a common humanity,
of people everywhere constituting a moral community, and of a universal international law. However,
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our enthusiasm for these noble ideals needs to be disciplined by recognition of the severe practical limits
on their effective domain. And the problem lies not
only in the frequency with which these grand conceptions are honored in the breach, but rather in the fact
that each of them lends itself to contestable interpretation and hence exploitation as claimed justification for
misdeeds. To make the matter plain beyond doubt, I
am suggesting that international law provides a hunting license for those who wish to shoot, while moral
argument is apt to be inherently contestable.30
If law and ethics are weak reeds to lean upon in
taming military force (or violence), what can be said
of technology, tactics, and strategy? Is it possible to
civilize warfare, to wage war without the death and
destruction imposed in warfare? The answer is no.
However, warfare produces a spectrum of pain ranging from the precise and probably very sharp, all the
way to blunt mega-economy size. The citizen as practicing ethicist has to ask himself whether quantity affects quality, in moral terms? Is military force more
usable when it is applied carefully, in small measured
amounts against objectively guilty targets? Whether
military force is useful, as well as usable, is another
matter, albeit a connected one. Plainly, military force
has little utility if it is judged unusable on moral, legal,
or political, grounds. In such circumstances, military
force effectively is removed from the table of available
options for grand strategy, meaning that its deterrent,
preventive, and denial potential will be forfeit.
A problem, probably the problem, with technical,
tactical, and strategic bundles of efforts to render warfare more acceptable to the liberal conscience, is that
they must fail.31 As the violent events of this century’s
early years remind us, even in an era when military
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force can be employed with unparalleled precision
and calibration, force still manifests as violence that
does damage and causes pain and death. One might
have hoped that when America came to wage war
with only regular volunteer soldiers, and to fight in
the kinds of conflicts and in ways such that casualties
would be unprecedentedly low by national historical
standards, military force would be inoculated against
serious ethical or political challenge. I must hasten
to add, however, that the use of military force nearly
always will be challengeable on political or strategic
grounds. However, one might have expected a military instrument comprising only military professionals and applying force with high discrimination and
discretion to be a readily usable and fairly noncontroversial tool of policy. Such has not proved to be the
case.
It is of political and arguably of moral significance
that military force can deliver a more precise blow
than ever before. But in public discourse on military
force, the noun is apt to trump the adjective. The bar
is now much higher for acceptable instrumental violence. However, the issue here being social science
and not physical science, one must acknowledge the
strong probability that the moral judgment involved
here is heavily situational, politically and strategically speaking. When Chancellor Otto von Bismarck
observed that the Balkans were not worth the bones of
a single Pomeranian grenadier, he flagged most helpfully the point that I must emphasize, namely, the intimate relationship between costs and expected gains.
The utility of military force does not have a fixed-determinant value for a polity in a particular historical
period. Rather, that utility must be estimated, meaning guessed, in particular cases at particular times—
and one answer will not serve for all occasions.
26

Clausewitz warned against the perils of mistaking
the character of a war for something that it is not, or
trying to transform war into something that is alien
to its nature.32 It is in the nature of war to be violent.
A military instrument may be capable of precise employment, but it remains a military instrument whose
function is violence, notwithstanding the purposes
for which it may be committed. The attendant political intentions are to be realized by military achievement.33 Many scholars and other commentators have
made the serious taxonomic error of inadvertently, innocently, treating war (and warfare) as though it were
a branch of ethics or law. Their worthy efforts thus to
tame war continue to be frustrated because the mission literally is impossible. Warfare as applied ethics
or as “lawfare” inevitably is an illusion because it is in
the DNA of war, as it were, to be political. The more
thoroughgoing projects aimed at controlling and perhaps even eliminating war by means of ethical and
legal restraints, choose to ignore the enduring reality
that politics is the engine of war. In practice, warfare
can escape political control and truly assume a purpose that is almost wholly self-regarding and autonomous. Although such a pathology is a real danger,
however, it cannot threaten the normative point that
warfare ought to be governed by politics, rather than
vice versa. Effective legal restraint on war requires that
there be a prior moral community, while the necessary moral community can exist and function as such
only on the foundation of a notable measure of political community.34 Military force has utility for reasons
that ultimately are political by definition. Thus the
logic of war matters more than does the grammar of
war, though the latter is always of significance, since
by definition it must entail threat, death and damage.35
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6. Soft power substantially is not discretionary and
the concept is more likely to mislead than to enlighten.
Soft power is a heroically imprecise concept, save
only with respect to what it is not—hard power. If
hard power is defined as the ability purposefully to
inflict pain or to reward in the pursuit of influence, it
is convenient and plausible to identify it with military
and economic instruments of policy. Therefore, its opposite, soft power, is the ability to achieve influence
by means other than military and economic. Joseph
S. Nye, Jr., has been the principal spokesman for soft
power. He explains as follows:
Everyone is familiar with hard power. We know
that military and economic might often get others to
change their position. Hard power can rest on inducement (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”). But sometimes
you can get the outcomes you want without tangible
threats or payoffs. The indirect way to get what you
want has sometimes been called “the second face of
power.” A country may obtain the outcomes it wants
in world politics because other countries—admiring
its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level
of prosperity and openness—want to follow it. In this
sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract
others in world politics, and not only to force them
to change by threatening military force or economic
sanctions. This soft power—getting others to want the
outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than
coerces them.36

Nye did not discover the seemingly glittering gem
that is the idea of soft power, and he makes no attempt
to suggest otherwise. We can say that he was the first
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to present the idea in full analytical rigor. Soft power
has been enjoyed and exercised from the very beginning of human social interaction. The concept attracts
attention today largely because it appears to offer an
approach to the achievement of influence in world
affairs that is complementary, and possibly even alternative, to that exercised through hard military and
economic power.
Before proceeding further, it is essential to grasp
the particular issue that we must regard as the examination question for this monograph. Specifically, the
question is whether or not soft power can and should
substitute for hard power. Further, if some substitution is possible, what are likely to be the advantages
and disadvantages of each course, that is, of the United
States achieving influence either “softly” or by means
of the pain and reward of hard-tempered power? Let
us explore the proposition that there is, or could be, a
soft power substitute for hard military power. Whether or not military power retains an absolute utility, it
may be determined that soft power can be as useful, or
more so, and probably at only a fraction of the cost. In
such comparisons, it is important not to be captured
analytically by the posing of unhelpful mutual exclusives: soft power or hard power; utility or disutility;
success or failure.
Soft power is potentially a dangerous idea not
because it is unsound, which it is not, but rather for
the faulty inference that careless or unwary observers draw from it. Such inferences are a challenge to
theorists because they are unable to control the ways
in which their ideas will be interpreted and applied
in practice by those unwary observers. Concepts can
be tricky. They seem to make sense of what otherwise is intellectually undergoverned space, and thus
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potentially come to control pliable minds. Given that
men behave as their minds suggest and command, it
is easy to understand why Clausewitz identified the
enemy’s will as the target for influence.37 Beliefs about
soft power in turn have potentially negative implications for attitudes toward the hard power of military
force and economic muscle.
Thus, soft power does not lend itself to careful regulation, adjustment, and calibration. What does this
mean? To begin with a vital contrast: whereas military
force and economic pressure (negative or positive) can
be applied by choice as to quantity and quality, soft
power cannot. (Of course, the enemy/rival too has a
vote on the outcome, regardless of the texture of the
power applied.) But hard power allows us to decide
how we will play in shaping and modulating the relevant narrative, even though the course of history must
be an interactive one once the engagement is joined. In
principle, we can turn the tap on or off at our discretion. The reality is apt to be somewhat different because, as noted above, the enemy, contingency, and
friction will intervene. But still a noteworthy measure
of initiative derives from the threat and use of military
force and economic power. But soft power is very different indeed as an instrument of policy. In fact, I am
tempted to challenge the proposition that soft power
can even be regarded as one (or more) among the
grand strategic instruments of policy.
The seeming validity and attractiveness of soft
power lead to easy exaggeration of its potency. Soft
power is admitted by all to defy metric analysis, but
this is not a fatal weakness. Indeed, the instruments of
hard power that do lend themselves readily to metric
assessment can also be unjustifiably seductive. But the
metrics of tactical calculation need not be strategically
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revealing. It is important to win battles, but victory in
war is a considerably different matter than the simple
accumulation of tactical successes. Thus, the burden
of proof remains on soft power: (1) What is this concept of soft power? (2) Where does it come from and
who or what controls it? and (3) Prudently assessed
and anticipated, what is the quantity and quality of its
potential influence? Let us now consider answers to
these questions.
7. Soft power lends itself too easily to mischaracterization as the (generally unavailable) alternative to
military and economic power.
The first of the three questions posed above all but
invites a misleading answer. Nye plausibly offers the
co-option of people rather than their coercion as the
defining principle of soft power.38 The source of possible misunderstanding is the fact that merely by conjuring an alternative species of power, an obvious but
unjustified sense of equivalence between the binary
elements is produced. Moreover, such an elementary
shortlist implies a fitness for comparison, an impression that the two options are like-for-like in their consequences, though not in their methods. By conceptually
corralling a country’s potentially attractive co-optive
assets under the umbrella of soft power, one is near
certain to devalue the significance of an enabling context. Power of all kinds depends upon context for its
value, but especially so for the soft variety. For power
to be influential, those who are to be influenced have a
decisive vote. But the effects of contemporary warfare
do not allow recipients the luxury of a vote. They are
coerced. On the other hand, the willingness to be coopted by American soft power varies hugely among
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recipients. In fact, there are many contexts wherein
the total of American soft power would add up in the
negative, not the positive. When soft power capabilities are strong in their values and cultural trappings,
there is always the danger that they will incite resentment, hostility, and a potent “blowback.” In those
cases, American soft power would indeed be strong,
but in a counterproductive direction. These conclusions imply no criticism of American soft power per se.
The problem would lie in the belief that soft power is
a reliable instrument of policy that could complement
or in some instances replace military force.
8. Soft power is perilously reliant on the calculations and feelings of frequently undermotivated
foreigners.
The second question above asked about the provenance and ownership of soft power. Nye correctly
notes that “soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does.” He
proceeds sensibly to contrast the armed forces along
with plainly national economic assets with the “soft
power resources [that] are separate from American
government and only partly responsive to its purposes.”39 Nye cites as a prominent example of this disjunction in responsiveness the fact that “[i]n the Vietnam
era . . . American government policy and popular
culture worked at cross-purposes.”40 Although soft
power can be employed purposefully as an instrument of national policy, such power is notably unpredictable in its potential influence, producing net benefit or harm. Bluntly stated, America is what it is, and
there are many in the world who do not like what it
is. The U.S. Government will have the ability to proj-
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ect American values in the hope, if not quite confident
expectation, that “the American way” will be found
attractive in alien parts of the world. Our hopes would
seem to be achievement of the following: (1) love and
respect of American ideals and artifacts (civilization);
(2) love and respect of America; and (3) willingness to
cooperate with American policy today and tomorrow.
Admittedly, this agenda is reductionist, but the cause
and desired effects are accurate enough. Culture is as
culture does and speaks and produces. The soft power
of values culturally expressed that others might find
attractive is always at risk to negation by the evidence
of national deeds that appear to contradict our cultural persona.
Moreover, no contemporary U.S. government
owns all of America’s soft power—a considerable
understatement. Nor do contemporary Americans
and their institutions own all of their country’s soft
power. America today is the product of America’s
many yesterdays, and the worldwide target audiences
for American soft power respond to the whole of the
America that they have perceived, including facts, legends, and myths.41 Obviously, what they understand
about America may well be substantially untrue, certainly it will be incomplete. At a minimum, foreigners
must react to an American soft power that is filtered
by their local cultural interpretation. America is a future-oriented country, ever remaking itself and believing that, with the grace of God, history moves forward
progressively toward an ever-better tomorrow. This
optimistic American futurism both contrasts with foreigners’ cultural pessimism—their golden ages may
lie in the past, not the future—which prevails in much
of the world and is liable to mislead Americans as to
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the reception our soft power story will have.42 Many
people indeed, probably most people, in the world
beyond the United States have a fairly settled view of
America, American purposes, and Americans. This locally held view derives from their whole experience of
exposure to things American as well as from the features of their own “cultural thoughtways” and history
that shape their interpretation of American-authored
words and deeds, past and present.43
This is not to say that soft power is unimportant or
invariably misapprehended. Perceptions of America
can and do alter over time. But the soft power of ideas
and of practices that non-Americans may be persuaded to adopt and possibly adapt with consequences
favorable for U.S. interests, do not constitute a policy
instrument (or basket of such instruments) seriously
comparable to military force. The greatest among history’s great powers have usually been attractive civilizations worthy of admiration and emulation as well
as potent coercers.44 Many foreigners have desired to
join the contemporary winner not only for reasons of
crude self-interest, but also to share the hegemonic
power’s style of living and advanced thought. The
flattery of imitation has an ancient historical lineage.
Imperial rule as well as the less mandatory hegemonic
influence has always been manifested in the practice of more or less voluntary co-option of those who
deemed it prudent, advantageous, and generally sensible to “follow the leader.”
All great powers should command respect, and not
infrequently they are also feared. But few genuinely
inspire a desire in others to emulate them culturally,
save for reasons of anticipated material advantage.
For example, China today does serve as a model worthy of respect for its thus far successful blending of
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economic advance with tight political control. However, such respect rests upon no normative element
beyond the values of greed and political discipline
(values refer only to that which is valued). The Chinese practice of governance might just possibly be
an example of soft power, but to label it thus betrays
democratic values. One could as well say that Benito
Mussolini’s Italy enjoyed some soft-power benefit as
an example of strong anti-democratic rule. Indeed, the
brutal modernist dictatorships of communism, fascism, and nazism, as well as their more or less pale
reflections outside Europe, provided much evidence
of soft power. Dictatorial leaders and party functionaries adopted and adapted foreign ideas of a firm
hand both because they appeared to work well, and
because the ideas of leadership, social discipline, and
a congeries of repressive measures held quite genuine
appeal. When Americans today think about the appeal of soft power, they often forget that the concept is
content-free. It is about voluntary co-option for reason
of an attraction of values, but it says nothing about
the particular values that are borrowed and somewhat
nationalized. A liking for genocide of the “unworthy”
has been known to have appeal across political and
cultural frontiers. Soft power is not by definition only
the soft power of humane liberal values.
It bears repeating because it passes unnoticed that
culture, and indeed civilization itself, are dynamic,
not static phenomena. They are what they are for
good and sufficient local geographical and historical
reasons, and cannot easily be adapted to fit changing
political and strategic needs. For an obvious example,
the dominant American strategic culture, though allowing exceptions, still retains its principal features,
the exploitation of technology and mass.45 These fea-
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tures can be pathological when circumstances are not
narrowly conducive to their exploitation. Much as it
was feared only a very few years ago that, in reaction
to the neglect of culture for decades previously, the
cultural turn in strategic studies was too sharp, so
today there is a danger that the critique of strategic
culturalism is proceeding too far.46 The error lies in the
search for, and inevitable finding of, “golden keys”
and “silver bullets” to resolve current versions of enduring problems. Soft-power salesmen have a potent
product-mix to sell, but they fail to appreciate the reality that American soft power is a product essentially
unalterable over a short span of years. As a country
with a cultural or civilizational brand that is unique
and mainly rooted in deep historical, geographical,
and ideational roots, America is not at liberty to emulate a major car manufacturer and advertise an extensive and varied model range of persuasive soft-power
profiles. Of course, some elements of soft power can
be emphasized purposefully in tailored word and
deed. However, foreign perceptions of the United
States are no more developed from a blank page than
the American past can be retooled and fine-tuned for
contemporary advantage. Frustrating though it may
be, a country cannot easily escape legacies from its
past.
9. The domain for the policy utility of soft power
typically is either structurally permissive of easy
success, or is unduly resistant to such influence.
The third fundamental question about soft power
in need of answer can best be posed in only two words,
“So what?” The combined fallacies of misnaming and
over-simplification that threaten the integrity and utility of the concept of soft power are more than merely
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an academic itch that can be scratched into oblivion.
The soft power concept is sufficiently valid intellectually that its contestable evidential base in history and
thus its true fragility are easily missed. To explain its
logic: soft power resides in the ability to co-opt the
willing rather than to coerce or compel the reluctant;
American soft power attracts non-Americans because
it represents or advances values, ideas, practices, and
arrangements that they judge to be in their interest,
or at least to which they feel some bond of affinity.
Therefore, the soft power of the American hegemon is
some conflation of perceived interests with ideological association (by and large more tacit than explicit).
Full-blown, the argument holds, first, that America
(for example) gains useful political clout if and when
foreigners who matter highly to U.S. national security
share important American understandings, values,
and preferences. The thesis proceeds in its second step
to package this thus far commonsense proposition under the banner of “soft power”; it is now dangerously
objectified, as if giving something a name causes it to
exist. Next, the third and most problematic step in the
argument is the logical leap that holds that American
soft power, as existing reality—what it is, and its effects—can be approached and treated usefully as an
instrument of national policy. This is an attractive
proposition: it is unfortunate that its promise is thoroughly unreliable. The problem lies in the extensive
middle region that lies between a near harmony of
values and perceived interests and, at the opposite end
of the spectrum, a close to complete antagonism between those values and interests. Historical evidence
as well as reason suggest that the effective domain of
soft power is modest. The scope and opportunity for
co-option by soft power are even less. People and polities have not usually been moved far by argument,
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enticement, and attractiveness. There will be some attraction to, and imitation of, a great power’s ideas and
practical example, but this fact has little consequence
for the utility of military force. Indeed, one suspects
that on many occasions what might be claimed as a
triumph for soft power is in reality no such thing. Societies and their political leaders may be genuinely
attracted to some features of American ideology and
practice, but the clinching reason for their agreement
to sign on to an American position or initiative will be
that the United States looks convincing as a guardian
state and coalition leader.
It is not difficult to identify reasons why military
force seems to be less useful as a source of security
than it once was. But it is less evident that soft power
can fill the space thus vacated by the military and
economic tools of grand strategy. Soft power should
become more potent, courtesy of the electronic revolution that enables a networked global community. The
ideological, political, and strategic consequences of
such globalization, however, are not quite as benign
as one might have predicted. It transpires that Francis
Fukuyama was wrong; the age of ideologically fueled
hostility has not passed after all.47 Also, it is not obvious that the future belongs to a distinctively Western
civilization.48 It is well not to forget that the Internet is
content-blind, and it advertises, promotes, and helps
enable bloody antagonism in addition to the harmony
of worldview that many optimists have anticipated.
It does not follow from all this that the hard power of
military force retains, let alone increases, its utility as
an instrument of policy. But assuredly it does follow
that the historical motives behind defense preparation
are not greatly diminished. Thus, there is some noteworthy disharmony between the need for hard power
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and its availability, beset as it increasingly is by liberal
global attitudes that heavily favor restraint.
10. Hard and soft power should be complementary,
but unless one is strategically competent, neither
will have high utility for policy, either singly or
“jointly.”
An inherent and unavoidable problem with a
country’s soft power is that it is near certain to be
misassessed by the politicians who attempt to govern
soft power’s societal owners and carriers. Few thoroughly encultured Americans are likely to undervalue
“the American way” in many of its aspects as a potent source of friendly self-co-option abroad. Often,
this self-flattering appreciation will be well justified
in reality. But as an already existing instrument of
American policy, the soft power of ideas and practical
example is fraught with the perils of self-delusion. If
one adheres to an ideology that is a heady mixture of
Christian ethics (“one nation, under God . . .”), democratic principles, and free market orthodoxy, and if
one is an American, which is to say if one is a citizen of
a somewhat hegemonic world power that undeniably
has enjoyed a notably successful historical passage to
date, then it is natural to confuse the national ideology
with a universal creed. Such confusion is only partial,
but nonetheless it is sufficiently damaging as to be a
danger to national strategy.
Since it is fallacious to assume that American values truly are universal, the domain of high relevance
and scope for American soft power to be influential is
distinctly limited. If one places major policy weight
on the putative value for policy of American soft
power, one needs to be acutely alert to the dangers of
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an under-recognized ethnocentrism born of cultural
ignorance. This ignorance breeds an arrogant disdain
for evidence of foreigners’ lack of interest in being coopted to join American civilization. The result of such
arrogance predictably is political and even military
strategic counterreaction. It is a case of good intentions gone bad when they are pursued with indifference toward the local cultural context.
Some people have difficulty grasping the unpalatable fact that much of the world is not receptive to
any American soft power that attempts to woo it to
the side of American interests. Not all rivalries are resolvable by ideas, formulas, or “deals” that seem fair
and equitable to us. There are conflicts wherein the
struggle is the message, to misquote Marshal MacLuhan, with value in the eyes of local belligerents. Not
all local conflicts around the world are amenable to
the calming effect of American soft power. True militarists of left and right, secular and religious, find intrinsic value in struggle and warfare, as A. J. Coates
has explained all too clearly.
The self-fulfilment and self-satisfaction that war generates derive in part from the religious or ideological
significance attributed to it and from the resultant
sense of participating in some grand design. It may
be, however, that the experience of war comes to be
prized for its own sake and not just for the great ends
that it serves or promotes. For many, the excitement
unique to war makes pacific pursuits seem insipid by
comparison. This understanding and experience of
moral, psychological, and emotional self-fulfillment
increase our tolerance for war and threaten its moral
regulation. It transforms war from an instrumental
into an expressive activity.49
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It is foolish to believe that every conflict contains
the seeds of its own resolution, merely awaiting suitable watering through co-option by soft power. To be
fair, similarly unreasonable faith in the disciplinary
value of (American) military force is also to be deplored.
Returning to the role of strategy, if America is strategically incompetent, it will not matter much which,
if any, policy instruments are available for execution.
One must add the codicil that, for good or ill, it is easier to employ military force on behalf of policy than it
is to attempt to tailor one’s soft power to fit the exact
need of the political moment. If military force is apt
to be a blunt instrument that lends itself to producing
unintended consequences, such indeterminacy of effects pales when compared to the problematic impact
of the soft power lurking in American civilization.
There is a monumental arrogance accompanied by a
breathtaking optimism about the proposition that soft
power should be an instrument of national policy. Of
course, one cannot simply dismiss soft power because
the historical evidence of its partial efficacy is undeniable. Soft power is not an illusion, but it is ever likely
to be uncontrollable and hence to defy strategic employment. Effects-based planning for grand strategy
must be so problematic with reference to soft power,
with its uncertain reception, as to require a large policy-health warning.
As for the complementarity of hard and soft power, there are so many unknowable third- and fourthorder effects, such redundancy of feedback loops, and
so much genuine indeterminacy of relative weights of
causal effects that it is extremely difficult to proceed to
an analytically satisfactory common-sense level of appreciation. Can we distinguish between voluntary cooption for reason of affection or respect, and co-option
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because of cynical calculation of material self-interest?
It is not so much the values and beliefs of foreigners
that matter, but rather their behavior. States cooperate with each other and sometimes tolerate inflicted
harm, because they respect the ability and presume a
willingness on the part of the villainous party to inflict
yet greater damage. Values are apt to be found compatible with perceived necessity in the rough world of
politics, domestic and international. The more authority that is accorded hard capabilities for influence, the
greater the ease with which soft power works its salubrious wonders. Great powers have ever believed that
they deserve some authority over their geographical
neighborhood.50 This belief has normative content; it
is not merely descriptive of relative strength of ability
to impose political will. The more “rightful” a great
power’s hegemony is deemed to be by its neighboring
states and societies, the more influence one should expect of its apparently soft power. Authority accepted
as legitimate and appropriate should be in scant need
of military, economic, or other direct forms of enforcement.
However, the complementarity between hard and
soft power that would seem to produce a regional
hegemony is apt to fail in the face of the antagonism
natural among human societies. Neighboring states,
whether of equal or unequal standing in material assets for power, tend to be antagonists.51 They have
much more to fight about than do polities distant from
each other, since both military and cultural menace is
more proximate and severe. Those among us who are
attracted by the idea of soft power, most especially
when the concept is contrasted with military force,
need to come to terms with the ferocity with which
civil warfare tends to be prosecuted. The substantial
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currency of soft power that multiple communities in a
single would-be polity share is in practice often overwhelmed by conflict-based ideational and economic
differences. Americans who are strongly attracted to
the appealing concept of soft power should reflect
upon its applicability to their own civil war, the most
bloody conflict in American history.
11. Soft power and hard power are more mutually
enabling than they are fungible.
While it is sensible to seek influence abroad as costeffectively as possible, it is only prudent to be modest
in one’s expectations of the soft power to be secured by
cultural influence. There are few, if any, absolutes in
this analysis, and the choices are not strictly either/or.
Military and economic coercion is not reliable because
the coercee is at liberty to decline to be coerced, albeit
at a cost. But influence sought through the target’s exposure to “the American way” is even less likely to
lend itself to predictable effects-based grand-strategic
planning. Every polity and society have features in
which they take pride—and the sources of pride can
vary widely in ways under-recognized abroad. The
soft power of America in all its aspects is not entirely
a power likely to produce American advantage. As
with all other polities, the United States has exhibited
a gap between noble collective aspiration and some
ignoble behavior. Foreign audiences are guided in
their interpretation of the American reality not by
an objective standard, but rather through the filter of
their own local culture. In other words, if one seeks
to export the American way purposefully as a soft
power instrument of national policy, one has to recall
that Americans will not be able to control the images
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of the American civilizational message as they will be
perceived abroad. This is not to say that there is no
soft power, far from it. Instead, it is to say that such
power is more like a wild card than a tool of known
universal utility.
Sad to relate, there is no convincing evidence suggesting an absence of demand for the threat and use
of military force. I write this in the context of prior acknowledgment of a still burgeoning “war convention”
that places potential restraints on the use of force. But
insecurity conditions continue to require the menace
of military force for their alleviation and occasional
resolution, even though the supply of such force at
present is ever problematic. One should not be confused by the trend in a more globalized world toward
restraining the military force that might be deployed
by the agents of order. Military force is more costly to
threaten and employ than it used to be, but it is not
necessarily always less useful or usable. Indeed, the
culture shock to liberal Westerners on witnessing the
exercise of brute force, can have a political value for
reason of its shocking political incorrectness. Consider the highly aggressive pre-planned use of military
power by Russia against U.S.-leaning Georgia in 2008.
For all the negative commentary that Moscow attracted from abroad, the net balance of consequences
between costs and political rewards probably was significantly weighted in favor of the rewards. Although
Russia gained respect for its political will by its aggressive behavior, the benefit was less than it might
have been had the United States and its North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies not been so actively engaged in their own military coercion during the
Gulf wars.
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Some readers might believe mistakenly that I demean or dismiss soft power. This is not so. True, the
argument advanced here has found soft power to be a
less useful tool of policy than is popularly supposed,
but this finding falls a fair distance short of dismissal.
Considering hard and soft power as partial or complete substitutes for each other, the following uncomfortable conclusions emerge:
•	There are cases in which neither soft power
nor hard power is able to deliver advantage,
let alone victory. Moreover, it is probable that
no combination of them could succeed. Scholars usually are able to postulate a miraculously
effective hypothetical intervention in the sad
course of history that should have delivered
success, but such can only be idle speculation.
•	Soft power is not a matter of either/or. It is entirely possible for much of American culture
to be shared and respected, but for that fact to
count for little with reference to policy choice.
Societies can penetrate each other deeply with
some of their values and practices, while simultaneously having a largely conflictual relationship for reason of interests perceived to be incompatible.
•	Historically, a context of total mutual disrespect among antagonistic societies and polities
is unusual. Politics and the interests that drive
it have a way of suppressing much cultural admiration, let alone affinity. When national interests are perceived as clashing, soft power is
an early victim. Examples abound, but prominent cases include the rise of Anglo-German
antagonism from the late 19th century, and that
of American-Japanese antagonism in the 20th
century.52
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•	While soft power theory offers the agreeable
proposition that American values and culture
generally have some ability to co-opt “others”
in an attractively economical way, historical
evidence seems to point in a different direction.
More accurately, the relationship is one wherein soft power flows to the owner of hard power.
Thucydides in ca. 400 BC is to be recommended
as a more reliable guide to international relations and foreign policy in the 21st century than
is Joseph S. Nye.53
•	Soft power is real and might often do some
good around the edges of policy. But soft power is mainly fool’s gold when it is considered as
a bona fide instrument of (American) policy.
•	But to question the efficacy of soft power is not,
ipso facto, to praise the utility of military force.
A challenge for policy in the 21st century reposes in the reality that neither hard nor soft
power is a reliable policy tool. A key difference
between the two, though, is that while it is both
necessary and practicable to regard military
force as a policy instrument, such cannot be
claimed for soft power. Unlike American soft
power, its military power is not an inherent
given. The capability to threaten and use military power is highly variable, even contingent,
and requires centralized official direction. Soft
power is thoroughly different. It is diffuse, substantially “given” and unalterable by sudden
central decision, and its effects (first, second,
third order?) on particular foreign audiences
are not easily predictable.
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CONCLUSION
The discussion has ranged widely over topics both
central and modestly tangential to the question of the
utility of military force in the 21st century. Because this
analysis has an educational rather than prescriptive
purpose, the focus has been upon how to think about
the relevance of military power as an instrument of
policy—most especially in relation to soft power—as a
substitute or complement. Five findings merit special
notice. They contain at least implicit recommendations regarding the utility of military force. Practical
applicability must, of course, be a function of actual
historical context. However, the United States and its
Army are more likely to make wise specific choices if
they enjoy a secure understanding in general terms.
General theory, meaning explanation, is essential education for the applied theory known as historical strategies and plans.54
1. Military force is not an anachronism; it is and
will long remain an essential instrument of policy.
Military force is not discretionary as an item in the
policy tool bag. Military force is not always the right
tool to employ, and even when it is appropriate, there
is no guarantee that it will be used effectively—but
these are matters extrinsic to the main point. There
are conflicts that cannot be resolved politically, sufficiently alleviated by diplomacy or any other nonmilitary means, or settled by some tolerable compromise.
For reasons amply covered in Thucydides's triptych
of “fear, honor, and interest,” warfare is a necessary
option as a sanction against unacceptable behavior by
hostile polities and other belligerents.55 The fact that
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it often does not deliver a politically satisfactory outcome is beside the point. Medicine and surgery do not
always work as required, either. Public opinion in a
notably pacifist liberal West tends to favor the attitude
that military force is anachronistic. The use of force
is usually held to be evidence of policy failure, since
wiser policy should have succeeded in prevention.
This view is as understandable as it is fashionable, but
still it is wrong. Even wise policy can fail, for example,
when foreign political leaders decline to be deterred
despite the obvious dictates of reason. Just as military
force has a unique ability among policy tools to create
expensive havoc, so also it has a distinctive capacity to
enable favorable decisions. The fact that military force
should be used only with great care and skill does not
minimize its unique importance. Warfare has shaped
and reshaped the course of history more significantly
than has any other impulse in the whole human experience.56
2. Military force is not under threat of obsolescence
because of the availability of “smart” soft power
alternatives, but its utility to liberal Western societies is menaced by the imprudent measure of their
imprudent enthusiasm for placing constraints upon
their use of it.
This second finding should not be taken as evidence of a reckless gung-ho attitude toward the threat
and use of military force. My concern is that our contemporary determination to employ force justly and
decently is in some danger of imperiling the prospects
for success in military missions. Of course, military
force should be used only as necessary and in the
quantity suitable to its task. The problem today is that
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our Western societies are more than a little ambivalent about the official use of force. Since military force
as an option in the policy tool bag is mandatory for
public safety, order, and prosperity, the challenge to
politicians and educated commentators is two-fold.
On the one hand, it is essential that our military force
is applied in accordance with reasonable interpretation of “just war” principles. But on the other, it is
also necessary that our authoritative legal and political interpretations of those principles do not destroy
our ability to prevail militarily when we must.57 If we
are not really convinced that we must prevail, then we
ought not to be fighting. The man in the street, qua
strategist, needs to understand that General William
Tecumseh Sherman was correct—war is hell. Warfare
without pain is an oxymoron.
3. Strategic competency is key to the utility of
military force for policy, but is less relevant to soft
power.
It is not quite valid to argue that strategy is the
key to the utility of both hard military (and economic)
power and of soft power. Whereas strategy should direct the military instrument according to the logic of
ends, ways, and means, soft power by its nature does
not lend itself to such control. American soft power is
largely what it is, regardless of official ambitions for
its effectiveness as a policy tool. The strategy function
is not entirely irrelevant, in that soft power can be considered in the classic terms, just cited—ends, ways,
and means. American military power is essentially a
tamed force (disciplined violence), even though it may
behave unpredictably in the interactive, dynamic, and
friction-prone environment of war. The country’s soft
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power, however, is notably untamed and untameable.
Because hard power and soft power roll off the tongue
as though they are comparable, even largely matching,
concepts, they are in fact totally asymmetrical, with
soft power on the short end. The two options are significantly beyond useful comparison. Hard power and
soft power are indeed two species of the power genus.
But the differences in all aspects of power generation
between the two species render the mere act of comparing them itself misleading. From the perspective
of public policy, military force is owned uniquely by
legitimate central political authority, whereas most of
the components of soft power are not grown, owned,
or controllable at will by policymakers. If military
force is akin to a domesticated animal, soft power is
more like one that cannot be domesticated. Soft power
is a dangerous concept, because it sounds far more usable than it is.
4. There is strategic advantage in moral advantage,
which translates as a requirement for the use of
military force to be plainly legitimate. 58
To wage only just wars justly cannot guarantee
success, but to wage unjust wars unjustly is close to a
guarantee of failure in the 21st century. The relevant
law and ethical precepts are clear enough, but they are
so subject to local interpretation, even when sincerely
undertaken, that the guidance they provide is a great
deal less prescriptively useful than they appear to
promise. Sadly, both law and ethics are found useful
in practice in good part because they lend themselves
to permissive self-serving justification by belligerents.
That said, there is a moral dimension to international
conflict,59 albeit one that is severely short of objective
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and authoritative policing. Ethics are universal, but
specific ethical philosophies, traditions, and schools
vary hugely. Much of the universality of ethics disappears down the cracks created by particular cultures,
local contexts, priorities, values, and habits. Since
the human will is the most important component of
fighting power, the readiness of that will to apply itself to the lethal business of warfare has to be a subject of prime strategic importance. We humans are
moral beings, meaning that we are all more or less in
thrall to one or more ethical tradition that educates,
even programs, our moral judgment. Soldiers do not
fight hard for a cause because that cause objectively
is “just,” but rather because they believe it to be so.
If confidence in the rightness of a soldier’s efforts is
shaken, there are certain to be consequences adverse
to his or her military effectiveness. The hard power
of military force is especially vulnerable to enfeeblement by the ill consequences of moral self-doubt. Our
liberal Western democracies are not warrior societies.60 The values of militarism are not the ones that we
endorse and encourage, even among our professional
soldiers. However, in contrast to the European context
in general, the United States does appear to encourage some attitudes in its military personnel that verge
upon the militaristic. The frontier between militarism
and military professionalism is crossed when prowess in warfare is regarded as a value in itself, as expressive achievement, rather than as an instrumental
value. Properly explained, the behavior of American
soldiers, including warriors (few soldiers truly are or
need to be warriors),61 is not “about” warfare; instead
it is “about” the generation of strategic effects on behalf of the ends of political policy. Liberal Western societies need the services of some warriors—among the
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mass of its soldiers—who will deliver military force
for reasons and in ways that they have no great difficulty understanding as legitimate. If the moral dimension to a contemporary conflict is devalued during the
ongoing audit of public perception, then the nation’s
strategic effort is all but certain to be fatally damaged.
There will be a spiral of self-doubt at home and in the
field, characterized by diminished military effectiveness, encouragement of the enemy, and an inevitable
search for guilty people to blame.
5. Soft power tends to co-opt the readily co-optable,
while hard military power is necessary for more demanding missions.
Paradox and irony reign over strategic matters.62
It is paradoxical that soft power works well when it
is not needed, but is irrelevant or nearly so when it
could make all the difference. America requires hard
military and economic power, effectively guided by
good enough strategy, precisely because the country’s soft power does not enjoy universal dominion.
A world of states, nations, and societies that is not
immediately recognizable as being at least a simulacrum of the American model of culture and civilization cannot be regarded as an audience palpitating
for enlightenment. This thought is heretical to many
Americans who believe we as a nation are on a historical missionary journey for the general improvement
of Mankind. The American civilization is heavily ideological. Indeed, the whole notion of soft power in its
appeal to Americans resides in the linked beliefs that:
(1) our way is the better way, and (2) understanding
of our way on the part of “Others” will induce, or seduce, them into becoming co-optees to the American

52

worldview. The basis of the high regard Americans
are inclined to have for soft power—aside from its low
cost as compared with military force—lies in cultural
hubris. It seems rarely to occur to us that we ourselves
might be more vulnerable to civilizational co-option
than are some others. Nor are we sure whether our
apparent co-opting of others by soft power is received
with genuine appreciation or as a prudent calculation. Overall, although having soft power is always
welcome, the contexts wherein its presumably benign
effects would be most useful are precisely those where
it is least likely to work its magic successfully.
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